Money Supply and Monetary Base_

Event_Log

1. 011973Oil price shockAssociation

   OPEC price increases following the Arab oil embargo roughly quadruple Iran's oil revenue, fueling a large-scale but overheated state spending boom (Fifth Development Plan, 1973-78).

   Why this link: OPEC price increases following the Arab oil embargo roughly quadrupled Iran's per-barrel oil revenue within a year, directly and immediately raising oil rents as a share of GDP and the government-finance series (tax/expenditure/revenue) once they begin coverage in 1972.

   Caveat: Government-finance series only start in 1972 so the pre-shock baseline is short; production volume itself did not fall (Iran actually raised output to capture market share), so any 'oil' effect here is on price/revenue, not physical production.

   Lag: same year to 1 year lagSource: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin
2. 021979Islamic RevolutionAssociation

   Mohammad Reza Shah's government falls; the Islamic Republic is proclaimed under Ayatollah Khomeini on 1 April 1979.

   Why this link: The new government inherited a fiscal apparatus in flux: oil-revenue collapse from the strike/export halt cut government revenue sharply, while post-revolution nationalizations and social spending commitments raised outlays, producing a fiscal position that moved on both sides of the ledger rather than in one clean direction.

   Caveat: Government-finance series end in 2009 for some components and have gaps; disentangling revenue-side from spending-side movements requires more granular budget data than these WDI aggregates provide.

   Lag: same year onwardSource: Encyclopaedia Britannica
3. 031980Iran-Iraq War beginsAssociation

   Eight-year war (1980-1988) imposes massive fiscal costs, disrupts oil exports, and entrenches a rationing/coupon system for basic goods.

   Why this link: War costs were financed heavily through central-bank borrowing and expanded budget deficits, directly shaping the government-debt and deficit series in this category (e.g. government debt to the central bank, which grows sharply over the war years).

   Caveat: Post-revolution fiscal reorganization, nationalization of industry, and oil-price swings independent of the war were also reshaping government finances over the same period, so not all movement in this category is attributable to war financing alone.

   Lag: same year, worsening through the warSource: Encyclopaedia Britannica
4. 041980Iraq invades Iran, opening the Iran-Iraq WarAssociation

   Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran begins an eight-year war financed heavily by loans from Gulf Arab states; Iraq accumulates an estimated $30-40bn in war debt to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alone, a burden that later feeds Iraq's economic grievances against Kuwait ahead of the 1990 invasion.

   Why this link: The eight-year war forced Iran into massive war financing (central-bank money creation, budget deficits), curtailed oil exports from the front-line Kharg terminal, disrupted trade routes, and drove military spending sharply higher, touching essentially every macro, fiscal, trade and price series for Iran across the 1980s.

   Caveat: The war coincided with the post-1979 Revolution's own economic disruption, nationalizations, capital flight, and separately imposed US/Western sanctions; disentangling the war's specific contribution from these simultaneous shocks is not possible from the aggregate data alone.

   Lag: gradual over 8 years (1980-1988)Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica
5. 0520032000s commodity super-cycleAssociation

   China's post-2001 WTO-driven infrastructure boom, alongside strong global growth, drives the IMF commodity price index up roughly fourfold between January 2000 and mid-2008; crude oil rises from about $30/barrel in 2003 to a record $147/barrel on 11 July 2008, delivering a sustained fiscal windfall to every oil exporter in this database (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia) before the Global Financial Crisis abruptly ends the cycle.

   Why this link: The oil windfall financed large government spending and central-bank credit expansion under the Ahmadinejad administration, a widely cited driver of the mid-2000s surge in Iranian money supply and monetary base.

   Caveat: Domestic monetary and credit policy choices (subsidized lending, the Maskan-e Mehr housing scheme) were discretionary decisions layered on top of the oil windfall, not an automatic mechanical link.

   Lag: gradual over the periodSource: US Energy Information Administration
6. 062007Mehr Housing Scheme launchedAssociation

   President Ahmadinejad launches the Maskan-e Mehr affordable-housing program, aiming to build millions of subsidized units on state land for low-income families; the Central Bank is directed to print money to fund the scheme, expanding the monetary base and contributing to a roughly nine-fold rise in housing prices and double-digit inflation through the following years.

   Why this link: The Central Bank was directed to print money to fund subsidized housing construction, a direct and documented driver of the roughly nine-fold expansion in the monetary base this chart covers.

   Caveat: Monetary-base growth over 2007-2013 was also driven by oil-revenue sterilization decisions, general fiscal deficits, and later the exchange-rate collapse under sanctions, so Mehr financing is a major but not sole contributor to this chart's trajectory.

   Lag: gradual over 2007-2013Source: Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University
7. 072017Unlicensed credit institutions collapse, sparking depositor protestsAssociation

   A wave of unregulated and quasi-regulated credit institutions (including Caspian and, months later, Ayandeh Bank) default on depositors after years of unsustainable interest promises and bad loans; recurring protests break out across dozens of cities through 2018-19, and the government later earmarks roughly $800m to address the fallout -- an early tremor of the banking-sector fragility that fed the December 2017 nationwide protests.

   Why this link: As Caspian, Ayandeh and other unregulated credit institutions defaulted, the Central Bank absorbed depositor payouts partly through liquidity injections, a mechanism plausibly visible in accelerated monetary-base and broad-money growth over 2017-19.

   Caveat: Iran's money supply was already expanding rapidly through this period on fiscal deficits and general credit growth, so the credit-institution bailouts are one contributor among several rather than the dominant driver of M2/monetary-base trends.

   Lag: 1-3 year lagSource: Radio Farda (RFE/RL Persian Service)

Related_Laws

Laws related to this measure. A law need not have caused a movement to be listed; confidence reflects how strong the link actually is.

1. 1973Planning and Budget Act

   Passed in 1973, this law establishes the Plan and Budget Organization and defines the country's planning hierarchy, from long-term and five-year development plans down to the annual state budget, setting out how development and current expenditures are classified and approved.

   Why this link: Article 1 defines the foundational vocabulary and institutional architecture (Plan & Budget Organization, five-year development plans, annual plans, current vs. development-budget credits) used to construct every subsequent Iranian national budget and five-year plan, making it the procedural backbone of the government-finance data series rather than a lever on any specific fiscal aggregate.

   Caveat: As a purely definitional/administrative statute it does not itself raise or lower spending, revenue, or debt; actual movements in government-finance charts over the following decades are driven by annual budget laws, oil-revenue swings, war, and sanctions, not by this framework law.

   Lag: institutional/structural, effects persist for decades
2. 1978National Budget Act for 1978-79 (1357)

   Passed in 1978, this is the annual state budget law setting total government revenue at about 4,039 billion rials and expenditure at about 4,178 billion rials for that fiscal year.

   Why this link: This is the base annual budget law for FY1357 (the last full pre-revolution fiscal year); the chart 'Mid-Year Supplementary Budget Additions' explicitly tracks FY1357 add-ons made against this baseline, and WDI's IRN government-finance series (which starts in 1972) also spans 1978.

   Caveat: 1978 was a year of acute political upheaval (mass strikes, oil-worker walkouts, capital flight) that disrupted both revenue collection and planned spending well beyond what the budget law itself dictated; supplementary additions reflect political/fiscal improvisation as much as the original law's design.

   Lag: same fiscal year, with mid-year revisions
3. 1979Bank Nationalization Act

   Passed in 1979 immediately after the revolution, this law declares all banks in Iran nationalized, citing the need to protect deposits and national capital, and empowers the government to appoint new bank managers whose signatures alone are legally valid.

   Why this link: The 1979 Revolutionary Council decree declared all banks state property overnight and vested management appointment power in the government, fundamentally restructuring the banking system from private/mixed ownership to full state control. This is a documented, direct instrument acting squarely on the banking/monetary system.

   Caveat: Confidence capped below 5 because the decree text itself is only two short articles with no granular targets (no explicit credit or deposit growth target), so the mapped charts capture downstream effects that are also driven by the broader 1979 revolution, capital flight, war economy (1980-88), and later banking reforms (e.g. post-2000 private bank re-licensing) rather than this decree alone. Direction is ambiguous: nationalization stabilized deposits short-term (state guarantee) but is widely blamed for credit misallocation and slower private-sector credit growth for decades.

   Lag: immediate legal effect, economic consequences over following years
4. 1981Budget Bill for 1981-82 (1360)

   Passed in 1981, this is the annual state budget law setting total government revenue and expenditure at about 3,166 billion rials for that fiscal year, amid the Iran-Iraq war.

   Why this link: The government budget bill for FY1360 set planned central-government spending and revenue for the second full year of the Iran-Iraq War; WDI's Iran government-finance series (starting 1972) spans this year, showing sharply rising nominal expenditure consistent with wartime budget growth.

   Caveat: This is recorded as a 'bill' (لايحه) in the source archive, so its exact enactment/amendment path is not confirmed from the text alone. Far more of the expenditure/revenue movement in FY1360 is attributable to the Iran-Iraq War itself (military mobilization, war damage, oil-export disruption from Kharg Island attacks) than to the budget law's own design; the war is the dominant confound for nearly every fiscal aggregate in this year.

   Lag: same fiscal year
5. 1984Supplementary Budget Act for 1983-84 (1362)

   Passed in 1984, this law adds 50 billion rials to the approved 1983-84 state budget, reallocating funds across agencies including the War Refugees Foundation, Ministry of Roads and the Ports and Shipping Organization, and sets eligibility rules for the year-end bonus paid to lower-paid government employees.

   Why this link: This supplementary budget law added 50 billion rials to the FY1362 budget, with roughly 20 billion rials of the addition allocated directly to the 'expenses and obligations arising from the imposed war' line, plus additions for war-refugee affairs, roads, and ports -- a wartime increase to government spending.

   Caveat: A relatively small addition (50bn rials) against the much larger wartime state budget; overall government-finance trends in this period were dominated by the Iran-Iraq War's fiscal burden and oil-revenue volatility, not this specific corrective law. We hold no chart with granular FY1362 Iranian budget data, so this is a broad category-level, low-confidence flag.

   Lag: same fiscal year (FY1362/1983-84)
6. 1987Public Accounting Act

   Passed in 1987, this law is Iran's core public financial management statute, governing how government revenue is collected, budgets executed, and public funds accounted for and audited across ministries, state agencies and public universities.

   Why this link: Article 1 defines the three-part structure of Iran's national budget (general government budget, dedicated-revenue agencies, state-enterprise/bank budgets) and governs treasury accounting/reporting procedures that underlie how subsequent fiscal statistics are compiled.

   Caveat: This is a pure accounting/procedural statute; it does not itself change any spending, revenue, debt or tax level, so any correlation with government-finance chart movements would be coincidental at best. Recorded as low-confidence context only.

   Lag: institutional/ongoing, no discrete lag
7. 1989Executive Bylaw of the National Cooperation Tax for Reconstruction Act

   Issued in 1989 to implement the 1988 National Cooperation Tax for Reconstruction Act, a post-war reconstruction levy, this bylaw sets up the tax administration office and the filing procedure, including installment plans of up to two years for taxpayers unable to pay in full.

   Why this link: This is the implementing bylaw for the one-off post-Iran-Iraq-War 'National Reconstruction Cooperation Tax' — a levy on real estate, imported/luxury cars, and other assets collected via provincial tax offices; it operationalizes collection mechanics (forms, deadlines, installment terms) for a real, if temporary, tax instrument.

   Caveat: This is the collection bylaw, not the underlying revenue-setting law; WDI government-finance series for Iran are sparse for the late-1980s war-reconstruction period so the tax's contribution may not be separable from broader post-war fiscal reconstruction spending and inflation. Confidence kept low given data coverage uncertainty.

   Lag: same to next fiscal year (1988-1990)
8. 1989National Budget Act for 1989-90 (1368)

   Passed in 1989, this is the annual state budget law setting total government revenue and expenditure at about 9,744 billion rials for that fiscal year, the first budget after the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

   Why this link: Routine annual appropriations act for the first postwar fiscal year (Iran-Iraq War ceasefire mid-1988), setting treasury working-capital limits (تنخواه‌گردان خزانه), sectoral credit allocations via Bank Markazi, and reconstruction/defense-related revenue provisions typical of the era's deficit-financed budgets, which fed into central-bank financing of government deficits.

   Caveat: This is a routine, un-exceptional annual budget rather than a distinct reform; our chart index has no dataset with 1368-specific granularity to isolate its effect, and government debt/monetary trends of this period are dominated by postwar reconstruction costs, oil-revenue swings, and cumulative effects of many successive annual budgets rather than this single year's law.

   Lag: same fiscal year (1989/1368), effects on debt stock cumulative over subsequent years
9. 1989Textual Correction to the Act Amending Certain Figures and Notes of the 1988-89 (1367) National Budget Act

   Passed in 1988, this law revises specific budget figures and notes in that year's national budget act, including raising a credit ceiling from 160 to 175 billion rials and reallocating funds between current and development accounts.

   Why this link: A technical mid-year correction to the FY1367 (last year of the Iran-Iraq War) budget law, raising one spending ceiling from 160bn to 175bn rials, shifting about 38bn rials between current and development accounts, and setting a 140bn-rial minimum foreign-exchange revenue target from oil-related receipts -- routine budget bookkeeping rather than a new policy direction.

   Caveat: These are minor technical line-item amendments; FY1367 fiscal outcomes were dominated by the final year of the Iran-Iraq War, the 1986 oil-price collapse's lingering effects, and high wartime inflation, not by this corrective law. We hold no chart with granular FY1367 Iranian budget data, so this is a broad category-level, low-confidence flag.

   Lag: same fiscal year (FY1367/1988-89)
10. 1991National Budget Act for 1991-92 (1370)

    Passed in 1991, this is Iran's annual state budget law for the 1991-92 fiscal year, setting the government's total revenue and expenditure ceilings and containing dozens of numbered notes authorizing specific spending, borrowing and administrative actions for that year.

    Why this link: The annual budget law is the primary legal instrument fixing central-government expenditure and revenue totals for FY1370, the first post-Iran-Iraq-War / First Five-Year Development Plan budget; WDI's Iran government-finance (GC.*) series begins exactly in 1972 and covers 1991, and SIPRI-based military expenditure share data begins in 1990, both spanning this fiscal year.

    Caveat: WDI general-government-finance figures reflect executed/reported outturn, not the enacted law's line items, and can diverge substantially from the appropriated budget due to inflation, exchange-rate distortions (multiple official rates in this era), and post-war reconstruction spending pressures. Reconstruction needs and oil-revenue recovery after the 1988 ceasefire are independent drivers of the same expenditure/revenue growth.

    Lag: same fiscal year
11. 2002Act Amending Certain Provisions of the Direct Taxation Act

    Passed in 2002, this law amends numerous articles of Iran's Direct Taxation Act, including redefining which entities, such as government ministries and publicly funded agencies, are exempt from direct taxes.

    Why this link: A comprehensive overhaul of Iran's Direct Taxes Law (revised inheritance-tax brackets, repeal/consolidation of dozens of articles, and later a unified flat corporate/legal-entity tax rate). This is a documented, named tax-policy instrument directly acting on income/profit tax administration and rates, which is exactly what the WDI GC.TAX.YPKG (taxes on income, profits & capital gains) and GC.TAX.TOTL (total tax revenue) series measure; IRN data for these series runs through the relevant post-2001 years.

    Caveat: Tax revenue in nominal/real terms is also driven by oil-price cycles, exchange-rate movements (rial depreciation raises nominal LCU-denominated revenue), inflation, and enforcement/compliance capacity independent of the statutory rate changes; the WDI series is an aggregate outturn measure, not a rate series, so it conflates rate design with base growth and collection efficiency.

    Lag: 1-3 year lag (tax-code changes affect the following fiscal years' collections)
12. 2002Act Adding Articles to the Act on Regulating Part of the Government's Financial Regulations (1)

    Passed in 2005, this law adds provisions to the 2002 framework act on government financial regulations, requiring the Central Bank to net foreign debt repayments against the annual budget and authorizing government agencies and utilities to open rial letters of credit for domestic contractors on capital projects.

    Why this link: This is a broad omnibus fiscal-management law amending state financial regulations: it governs government/state-company budget execution, forex-debt bookkeeping at the central bank, letters-of-credit financing for public works, agricultural credit terms, and treasury guarantees for BOT infrastructure projects, touching many items tracked under Government Finance (expenditure composition, subsidies/transfers, government debt).

    Caveat: As an omnibus law with dozens of largely technical, unrelated provisions (customs anti-dumping powers, wheat-milling liberalization, land-registry fees, worker training funds), no single Government Finance metric can be cleanly attributed to it; broader fiscal trends are driven far more by oil revenue, sanctions, and successive budget laws than by this particular amending statute.

    Lag: multi-year, gradual
13. 2002Act Adding Articles to the Act on Regulating Part of the Government's Financial Regulations (1)

    Passed in 2002, this law adds provisions to the framework act on government financial regulations, requiring the Central Bank to net foreign debt repayments against the annual budget and authorizing government agencies and utilities to open rial letters of credit for domestic contractors on capital projects.

    Why this link: Duplicate record of law_id 88b5593dfcb8 (same omnibus fiscal-management statute); see that record for the underlying mechanism.

    Caveat: Same caveats as the primary entry: omnibus law with many unrelated technical provisions, effect on any single Government Finance metric is not separately identifiable from oil-revenue and sanctions-driven fiscal trends.

    Lag: multi-year, gradual
14. 2002Act on Regulating Part of the Government's Financial Regulations

    Passed in 2002, this framework law regulates a range of government financial matters, including the legal and financial-reporting status of state-owned companies, in order to streamline public financial management.

    Why this link: This omnibus law is a procedural/administrative framework governing how state agencies collect and dispose of revenue, set fees, and manage extra-budgetary funds (spanning dozens of unrelated sectoral provisions), which structurally shapes subsequent annual budget composition and government-finance reporting rather than moving any single fiscal aggregate directly.

    Caveat: This is a broad framework law touching many unrelated administrative domains simultaneously (agriculture, education, health, employment, etc.); it is not a targeted fiscal instrument, so any observed movement in government-finance aggregates after 2002 is much more plausibly driven by oil revenue, inflation, sanctions, or subsequent annual budget laws than by this law specifically.

    Lag: gradual, multi-year (procedural framework in force from 2002 onward)
15. 2005Act Determining the Ceiling for the Issuance of Participation Bonds by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran

    Approved in 1384 (2005), it authorized the Central Bank to issue up to 15,000 billion rials of participation bonds by the end of that year, with the provisional return rate set by the Money and Credit Council and proceeds restricted to productive investment structured through Islamic contracts.

    Why this link: Authorized the Central Bank to issue up to 15,000 billion rials of 'musharakah' participation bonds by year-end 1384, with the coupon rate pegged to bank deposit rates and proceeds legally restricted to productive investment via Islamic contracts — a liquidity-mobilization/short-term sterilization tool.

    Caveat: 15,000 billion rials was a small fraction of Iran's total M2 by 2005; monetary base and broad money growth in this period were dominated by oil-revenue inflows and government deficit financing through the banking system, not this single bond ceiling.

    Lag: same fiscal year
16. 2006Act Determining the Ceiling for the Issuance of Participation Bonds by the Central Bank of Iran

    Passed in August 2006, this law authorized the Central Bank of Iran to issue up to 20,000 billion rials in participation bonds during 1385 (2006/07) to help control liquidity.

    Why this link: Authorizes the Central Bank (under the 4th Development Plan, Art.10h) to issue up to 20 trillion rials of participation bonds explicitly 'to control liquidity' - a sterilization tool intended to slow M2/monetary-base growth.

    Caveat: The authorized ceiling was tiny relative to total M2 by 2006; broad money growth in this period was driven far more by oil-revenue-fueled bank credit expansion and government deficit financing. One of several minor sterilization instruments, not the primary driver of the aggregate.

    Lag: same fiscal year to following year
17. 2007National Budget Act for 2007-08 (1386)

    Passed in 2007, this is the annual state budget law setting total government resources and expenditures at roughly 2,317,000 billion rials for that fiscal year.

    Why this link: This is the full national annual budget law for FY1386, setting the government's approved total revenue and expenditure allocations for that year, the direct legal source of the FY1386 data point in the annual budget-totals series.

    Caveat: The chart is a mechanical record of enacted budget totals across many years, so this record is close to definitional for the FY1386 data point rather than an independent causal claim about behavior; actual budget execution (vs. the enacted law) can and often does diverge due to oil-revenue shortfalls, supplementary budgets, and inflation.

    Lag: same fiscal year (FY1386 / 2007-08)
18. 2007Act on the Issuance of Participation Bonds by the Central Bank of Iran

    Passed in July 2007, this law authorized the Central Bank of Iran to issue 40,000 billion rials in participation bonds to implement monetary policy and control liquidity, under the interest-free banking framework.

    Why this link: Authorizes CBI to issue up to 40 trillion rials of participation bonds under the interest-free banking framework 'to implement monetary policy and control liquidity.'

    Caveat: Same-year oil windfalls, expansionary government spending, and rapid bank credit growth were much larger drivers of the 2007 monetary aggregates than this single bond tranche; part of a recurring annual series of similar bond-ceiling laws.

    Lag: same fiscal year to following year
19. 2007Act on the Issuance of Participation Bonds by the Central Bank of Iran

    Passed in February 2007, this law authorized the Central Bank of Iran to issue 10,000 billion rials in participation bonds to implement monetary policy and control liquidity, under the interest-free banking framework.

    Why this link: Same instrument type: authorizes CBI to issue 10 trillion rials of participation bonds under Art.10(h) of the 4th Plan to implement monetary policy and control liquidity.

    Caveat: Small in scale relative to total M2; part of a repeated annual bond-ceiling authorization pattern rather than a distinct one-off shock, overshadowed by oil-revenue-driven liquidity growth.

    Lag: same fiscal year to following year
20. 2007Executive Bylaw of the Unorganized Monetary Market Regulation Act

    Implements the Act on Regulating the Unorganized Monetary Market by requiring non-bank credit and financial institutions, currency exchange bureaus and leasing companies to obtain a license from the Central Bank of Iran and comply with its prudential and capital rules, bringing informal money-lending and credit activity under Central Bank supervision.

    Why this link: Requires any person or entity conducting deposit-taking or lending ('banking operations') to obtain a Central Bank license, directing police to shut down unlicensed operators; this formalization mechanism plausibly shifted some previously unmeasured informal-sector credit/deposits into the officially measured banking system, affecting recorded money-supply and private-credit aggregates.

    Caveat: Iran's shadow/informal credit market (gray-market money lenders, unlicensed 'credit institutions') persisted and grew substantially after this bylaw despite it, particularly the unlicensed-institution crisis of the 2010s; measured M2/private-credit growth in this period is dominated by CBI monetary-base creation, sanctions-driven dollarization, and licensed non-bank credit institution expansion rather than enforcement against informal lenders.

    Lag: 1-3 year lag
21. 2015Act Adding Certain Articles to the Act on Regulating Part of the Government's Financial Regulations (2)

    Passed in 2015, this law adds a further set of articles to the government's financial regulations framework, covering matters such as National Development Fund lending terms and additional levies on tobacco products.

    Why this link: This is a large omnibus fiscal-management law (86 articles) restructuring multiple government-finance mechanisms simultaneously: an added annual VAT surtax for health financing, a new formula for settling accounts between the Treasury and the Oil Ministry over crude/gas-condensate export revenue, National Development Fund allocation rules, and mandated restructuring of public pension funds. Because it touches tax revenue, oil-revenue distribution, and public debt/pension mechanics at once, it is a genuine contributing driver of several government-finance aggregates rather than a single-measure instrument.

    Caveat: The law bundles many distinct provisions with offsetting fiscal directions (new revenue sources vs. new earmarked expenditures), so no single directional effect on any one aggregate can be asserted with confidence. Oil-price swings, sanctions, and annual budget laws passed in the same years are much larger drivers of these same series.

    Lag: same fiscal year onward, effects compounding over subsequent years
22. 2017Executive Bylaw of Note 35 and Row 1 of Table No. 3 to Note 36 of the Act Amending the National Budget Act for 1395 (2016)

    On 29/10/1395 AH (2017), the Cabinet set the mechanism for using the Central Bank's revaluation surplus on foreign-currency reserves, worth hundreds of trillions of rials, to write off part of the government's debt to state-owned banks and to increase the government's paid-in capital in those banks according to a bank-by-bank table, and authorized up to 100,000 billion rials in interest forgiveness on agricultural loans.

    Why this link: Uses the Central Bank's 'surplus account' from revaluing its net foreign-currency assets (i.e., the paper gain from rial depreciation) to write off up to ~331 trillion rials of state banks' debt to the Central Bank (overdrafts, credit lines, deposits) and to inject that same amount as fresh government capital into six state banks (Melli, Sepah, Keshavarzi, Sanat-o-Madan, Tose'e Saderat, Tose'e Ta'avon, later Maskan) -- a direct, documented instrument acting on the government/bank debt-to-central-bank stock and on the monetary base, since FX-revaluation gains being spent this way is a quasi-fiscal expansion of central bank liabilities.

    Caveat: State banks' debt to the central bank and the monetary base are driven by many other forces in the same years (repeated large-scale currency devaluations 1397-1401, sanctions-driven FX shortages, ordinary deficit monetization, other bank-recapitalization rounds). This single bylaw is one of several such capital-injection/write-off rounds in the period, so its isolated contribution to the aggregate series cannot be cleanly separated from the rest.

    Lag: same to next fiscal year (accounting entries booked as the offsets are executed, 1395-1398)
23. 2017Permanent Provisions of the Development Plans Act

    Passed in 2017, this law consolidates a set of economic and administrative provisions, spanning taxation, welfare and employment, that apply permanently rather than expiring with each five-year development plan, reducing the need to re-legislate them every planning cycle.

    Why this link: This omnibus permanent-provisions law (73 articles) codifies a 'managed float' exchange-rate regime, central bank governance rules, National Development Fund oil-revenue-savings mandates (min. 30% of oil export proceeds), and dozens of standing fiscal/banking/customs rules that replaced the need for repeated multi-year development-plan legislation.

    Caveat: This is an extremely broad, multi-topic codification law covering nearly every economic domain at once; it is not a single-mechanism instrument, so any one chart's movement is very unlikely to be attributable mainly to it rather than to the specific sectoral rules, sanctions, or macro shocks operating alongside it. Confidence is kept low deliberately given this breadth.

    Lag: standing framework from 2017 onward