Iran in Data
wdi__NE.TRD.GNFS1960–2025Download CSV

Trade (% of GDP)

Trade (% of GDP)

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Event_Log

  1. 011973Oil price shockAssociation

    OPEC price increases following the Arab oil embargo roughly quadruple Iran's oil revenue, fueling a large-scale but overheated state spending boom (Fifth Development Plan, 1973-78).

    Why this link: Trade openness jumped from 54.1% of GDP (1973) to a historic peak of 76.1% (1975) as oil export values (counted within trade) quadrupled in the wake of the OPEC price shock.

    Caveat: None substantial.

  2. 0219861986 oil price collapseAssociation

    Saudi Arabia abandons its swing-producer role; oil prices crash from ~$27 to under $10/barrel, straining every oil-exporting economy in this database (Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, USSR, Iran).

    Why this link: Trade fell steadily from 38.7% of GDP (1983) to a historic trough of 14.1% (1986), the lowest point in the 65-year series, as the global 1986 oil-price crash combined with wartime shipping disruption (the Iran-Iraq War's 'Tanker War') and the standing 1980 US trade embargo to depress both oil exports and import capacity simultaneously.

    Caveat: Three overlapping causes (global oil price, war-driven shipping/blockade disruption, and the standing US embargo) make it impossible to attribute the specific magnitude to any single factor.

  3. 031989First Post-War Five-Year Plan (Rafsanjani reconstruction)Association

    Rafsanjani government begins post-war economic liberalization and reconstruction planning after Khomeini's death (June 1989).

    Why this link: Trade openness rebounded from 27.9% (1989) to 44.2% of GDP (1991) as the post-war reconstruction plan reopened import channels for capital goods and consumer products.

    Caveat: None substantial.

  4. 042018US withdraws from JCPOAAssociation

    President Trump announces US withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanctions after 90/180-day wind-down periods (effective Aug 7 and Nov 5, 2018).

    Why this link: Trade's GDP share jumped from 43.2% (2017) to 56.6% (2018), the sharpest single-year move in two decades. Part of this reflects the extreme currency repricing that year (the April 2018 unification attempt followed by the post-withdrawal rial collapse) rather than a genuine real trade-volume surge; some may also be firms front-loading import/export transactions ahead of expected sanctions.

    Caveat: Hard to separate real trade-volume change from FX-conversion/deflator effects in a % of GDP series during a year with this much currency volatility.

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