Producer Price Index
Same 6-edition ladder and extraction method as the CPI-Urban row above, same PDFs, same base-year-segmented / never-spliced discipline.
Event_Log
011958Devaluation and first IMF Stabilization ProgramRelevanceAttribution
Turkey agrees its first IMF/OEEC stabilization program after a severe balance-of-payments crisis, carrying out a de facto devaluation to about TL9/$1, credit ceilings, and decontrol of foreign trade, backed by $359m in Western financing.
Why this link: Stabilization programs of this type typically curb the inflation shown in this comparator series after a balance-of-payments crisis.
Caveat: Series for Turkey starts in 1960; effect on 1958-59 inflation is not directly observable on this chart.
021975"Rodrigazo" devaluation and inflation shockRelevanceAttribution
Economy Minister Celestino Rodrigo devalues the peso 150%, unifies exchange rates, and raises utility/fuel prices 100-200% under President Isabel Perón; monthly inflation surges past 20%, annual inflation rises from 24% (1974) to 182% (1975), and the shock fractures Peronist labor support ahead of the 1976 coup.
Why this link: The 'Rodrigazo' was a one-off maxi-devaluation and price/tariff shock that directly drove Argentina's measured inflation from 24% in 1974 to 182% in 1975, a jump visible as a sharp spike on Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart.
Caveat: This chart shows Iran alongside comparator economies including Argentina (ARG); the shock explains only Argentina's 1975 spike, not Iran's own inflation path.
Lag: Immediate, within the same calendar year (June-December 1975).Source: Wikipedia — Rodrigazo (cross-check)0319761976 military coup begins Process of National ReorganizationRelevanceAttribution
A military junta led by Jorge Rafael Videla overthrows President Isabel Perón. The new economy minister, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz (appointed 29 March 1976), launches a sweeping market-liberalization program — deregulating prices, unifying and devaluing the exchange rate, and opening trade — while the dictatorship (1976-1983) wages the "Dirty War" against political opponents.
Why this link: Price deregulation under the junta's economic program is one contributing driver of Argentina's chronic high inflation through the late 1970s, visible as elevated readings on Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart.
Caveat: Argentina's inflation in this period is multi-causal (fiscal deficits, wage-price dynamics, the later Tablita); the coup's specific contribution cannot be isolated.
Lag: Gradual, building over 1976-1978.Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica — Dirty War (Argentina)041978"Tablita" pre-announced exchange-rate schedule introducedRelevanceAttribution
Economy Minister Martínez de Hoz publishes a declining monthly-devaluation timetable to anchor inflation expectations; the peso becomes badly overvalued as local inflation outruns the schedule, and the policy collapses in a sharp February 1981 devaluation.
Why this link: The Tablita was explicitly designed to anchor inflation expectations, so Argentina's inflation readings in this comparator chart are a direct test of (and ultimately show the failure of) the policy.
Caveat: Inflation remained multi-causal throughout; the policy's specific restraining (or, later, destabilizing) effect cannot be cleanly isolated from fiscal and wage dynamics.
Lag: Gradual, 1979-1981.Source: Latin American Research Review — Cambridge University Press051979IMF standby arrangement amid pre-Özal crisisRelevanceAttribution
Demirel government secures IMF backing as inflation and balance-of-payments pressure mount ahead of the more sweeping January 1980 liberalization program.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; the 1979 IMF standby was an attempt to arrest the accelerating inflation and balance-of-payments pressure visible in the run-up to 1980.
Caveat: The program was largely superseded within months by the more sweeping January 1980 liberalization, making its standalone effect hard to isolate.
Lag: Short-term, largely overtaken by the 1980 programSource: IMF Turkey country page061980Özal liberalization programRelevanceAttribution
Turgut Özal's "24 January Decisions" shift Turkey from import-substitution to export-oriented, market-liberal policy following a severe balance-of-payments crisis.
Why this link: The program's devaluation and price decontrol directly targeted Turkey's high inflation, a core aim reflected in this comparator series.
Caveat: Inflation remained persistently high through the 1980s-90s for reasons well beyond this single program.
Lag: 1-2 yearsSource: Wikipedia — Turgut Özal (cross-check)071985Austral Plan currency reformRelevanceAttribution
Economy Minister Sourrouille launches a heterodox stabilization plan under President Alfonsín, replacing the peso argentino with a new currency (the austral, at 1,000:1) alongside a wage-price-exchange-rate freeze; monthly inflation drops from over 30% to near 2% before the plan unravels by late 1986.
Why this link: The heterodox wage-price-exchange-rate freeze drove Argentina's monthly inflation down from over 30% to near 2% almost immediately, a direct and well-documented effect visible in Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart before the plan unraveled by late 1986.
Caveat: The disinflation was short-lived; underlying fiscal imbalances were not resolved, so later-year readings reflect the plan's failure rather than its initial success.
Lag: Immediate, within weeks of the June 1985 launch.Source: Government of Argentina — official announcement retrospective081989Hyperinflation forces Alfonsín's early resignationRelevanceAttribution
Monthly inflation reaches roughly 200% by July 1989 (annualized well into four digits) amid riots and looting; President Raúl Alfonsín resigns six months early, handing power to president-elect Carlos Menem on 8 July 1989 in Argentina's first hyperinflationary collapse of the modern era.
Why this link: This is Argentina's hyperinflation episode itself (monthly inflation near 200% by July 1989, annualized in the thousands); it is the direct, isolatable cause of the extreme spike visible on Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart.
Caveat: Comparator line for Argentina only; the episode reflects a build-up of fiscal and monetary imbalances over the 1980s, not a single-cause shock.
Lag: Immediate; the crisis is the inflation reading itself.Source: Wikipedia — 1989 hyperinflation in Argentina (cross-check)091990Plan Bonex — forced deposit-to-bond conversionRelevanceAttribution
Following 1989's roughly 3,080% annual hyperinflation, the Menem government forcibly converts most bank time deposits (about US$3bn) into 10-year "Bonex 89" dollar bonds, leaving depositors only a small cash portion — a precedent later echoed by the 2001 corralito.
Why this link: Plan Bonex was part of the post-hyperinflation stabilization effort; Argentina's inflation readings in early 1990 in this comparator chart reflect the continuing, only partially resolved crisis.
Caveat: Inflation remained extremely high and volatile into 1990-1991; Plan Bonex's specific disinflationary contribution cannot be isolated from other stabilization measures.
Lag: Weeks to months, early 1990.Source: Wikipedia — BONEX Plan (cross-check)101991Convertibility Plan pegs peso 1:1 to US dollarRelevanceAttribution
Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo's Convertibility Law (Ley 23.928) takes effect, establishing a currency-board regime that fixes the new peso at parity with the US dollar and backs the monetary base with reserves; annual inflation falls from 2,314% in 1990 to about 17% in 1991 and below 5% for the rest of the decade.
Why this link: The currency-board law is directly documented to have cut annual inflation from 2,314% in 1990 to about 17% in 1991 and below 5% thereafter, a clear, isolatable effect visible on Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart.
Caveat: Comparator line for Argentina only; the plan's later-decade costs (loss of monetary policy autonomy, eventual overvaluation) are not visible in this inflation series alone.
Lag: Rapid, within the same year (1991).Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office — "The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001"1119941994 currency crisisRelevanceAttribution
Lira loses over half its value amid fiscal imbalances and loss of investor confidence; IMF standby program follows.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; the lira's collapse of over half its value directly fed through to the inflation spike this measure records in 1994.
Caveat: Underlying fiscal imbalances that triggered the crisis were themselves years in the making.
Lag: Contemporaneous to 1-yearSource: Wikipedia — 1994 Turkish economic crisis (cross-check)121999IMF exchange-rate-based disinflation programRelevanceAttribution
Turkey adopts an IMF-backed program pre-announcing a crawling-peg exchange rate to break chronic inflation; the program collapses amid bank runs in November 2000 and the February 2001 currency crisis.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; the crawling-peg program's explicit target was breaking chronic Turkish inflation, an instrument aimed directly at this measure.
Caveat: The program collapsed within a year amid bank runs and the 2001 crisis, so any disinflation gain was short-lived and confounded by the subsequent shock.
Lag: Within a year, then reversed by the crisisSource: IMF Turkey country page1320012001 Turkish economic crisis ("Black Wednesday")RelevanceAttribution
Political clash between the president and prime minister triggers a banking-sector collapse; the lira loses roughly half its value and ~$70bn in value is wiped out system-wide.
Why this link: The lira's roughly 50% loss of value fed directly into a sharp inflation spike captured on this comparator series.
Caveat: Inflation was already chronically high before the crisis, so isolating the crisis-specific increment is imprecise.
Lag: Same yearSource: Türkiye Today142001Kemal Derviş stabilization programRelevanceAttribution
Newly appointed economy minister enacts sweeping reforms: central bank independence, bank recapitalization, a floating exchange-rate regime, and fiscal discipline, ending Turkey's fixed/managed exchange-rate era.
Why this link: The program's fiscal discipline and floating-rate regime underpin Turkey's structural disinflation trend visible on this comparator series through the decade.
Caveat: Disinflation also reflects the global low-inflation environment of the 2000s.
Lag: Multi-year disinflation through the 2000sSource: Wikipedia — Kemal Derviş (cross-check)152002Convertibility abandoned; peso floatedRelevanceAttribution
Congress passes the Public Emergency and Exchange-Rate Reform Law (Ley 25.561) under President Eduardo Duhalde, ending a decade of dollar convertibility, devaluing and floating the peso, and "pesifying" dollar-denominated bank deposits and debts at asymmetric rates — the peso falls from 1:1 to roughly 3.8 per dollar by September 2002.
Why this link: The devaluation's pass-through to domestic prices is a direct, well-documented driver of Argentina's roughly 41% inflation in 2002, visible on Argentina's line in this comparator inflation chart.
Caveat: Some of 2002's inflation also reflects supply disruptions and the broader banking/default crisis, not exchange-rate pass-through alone.
Lag: Within months of the January 2002 float.Source: AFIP (Argentina federal tax administration) — full text of Ley 25.5611620032000s commodity super-cycleRelevanceAttribution
China's post-2001 WTO-driven infrastructure boom, alongside strong global growth, drives the IMF commodity price index up roughly fourfold between January 2000 and mid-2008; crude oil rises from about $30/barrel in 2003 to a record $147/barrel on 11 July 2008, delivering a sustained fiscal windfall to every oil exporter in this database (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia) before the Global Financial Crisis abruptly ends the cycle.
Why this link: Oil-funded fiscal and monetary expansion during the super-cycle is a widely cited driver of Iran's persistently elevated inflation rate in the mid-to-late 2000s.
Caveat: Inflation in Iran has many structural drivers (subsidies, exchange-rate pass-through, liquidity growth); the oil cycle is one contributing channel among several.
Lag: 1-2 years.Source: US Energy Information Administration172005Currency redenominationRelevanceAttribution
Six zeros dropped, creating the "new Turkish lira" (YTL), a symbolic close to the high-inflation era of the 1990s/2000s.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; dropping six zeros is a purely nominal redenomination symbolizing the end of the high-inflation era already achieved by prior stabilization, not itself a driver.
Caveat: Redenomination has no mechanical effect on the inflation rate; it only rescales the nominal unit.
Lag: None; purely nominalSource: Wikipedia — Turkish lira (cross-check)182018US withdraws from the JCPOARelevanceAttribution
President Trump announces US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and directs the phased reimposition of all sanctions lifted in 2015-16, with full "snapback" effective 5 November 2018, reversing the 2015 sanctions-relief framework and re-isolating Iran's oil and banking sectors from the dollar system.
Why this link: The sanctions-driven rial collapse fed through into a sharp acceleration of consumer-price inflation from 2018 into 2019-2020, a well-known exchange-rate pass-through channel.
Caveat: Money-supply growth and subsidy/energy-price adjustments in late 2019 also contributed independently to this inflation surge.
1920182018 lira crisisRelevanceAttribution
Lira loses ~40% of its value against the US dollar within the month amid US sanctions/tariffs tied to the detention of pastor Andrew Brunson and broader current-account/inflation imbalances.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; the lira's ~40% monthly loss passed through directly to consumer prices, pushing inflation to roughly 25% by late 2018, a clear instrument-to-measure channel.
Caveat: Underlying current-account and inflation imbalances predate the crisis and are themselves partly why it occurred.
Lag: Same to following yearSource: Wikipedia — Turkish economic crisis 2018-current (cross-check)202019Central bank governor dismissedRelevanceAttribution
President Erdoğan removes Central Bank Governor Murat Çetinkaya over disagreement on interest-rate policy, beginning a pattern of governor turnover tied to unorthodox low-rate policy.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; this dismissal begins the pattern of political interference with monetary policy that fed into the sustained high-inflation era of the following years.
Caveat: This single dismissal is one instance in a repeated pattern; its standalone contribution to inflation is hard to isolate from later, larger episodes (2021 in particular).
Lag: Following years, as pattern repeatsSource: Wikipedia — Turkish economic crisis 2018-current (cross-check)212021Naci Ağbal dismissed after rate hikeRelevanceAttribution
Governor Ağbal removed days after raising rates to defend the lira; successor Kavcıoğlu cuts rates from 19% to 14% through 2021, driving a further currency collapse (lira down ~40% in 2021, ~30% in November alone).
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; Ağbal's dismissal for defending the lira, followed by rate cuts from 19% to 14%, is a well-documented, directly isolatable trigger of the lira collapse and resulting inflation surge captured here.
Caveat: Global inflation pressures from 2021-2022 also contributed to the level, but the Turkey-specific spike well above peers is directly traceable to this policy reversal.
Lag: Within months, building through 2022Source: Al Jazeera222022Russia launches full-scale invasion of UkraineRelevanceAttribution
Russian forces invade Ukraine on multiple fronts (see GLOBAL entry), triggering the largest European war since 1945 and the most extensive Western sanctions regime ever imposed on a major economy.
Why this link: The war-driven spike in global energy and food prices added to worldwide inflation in 2022, a small contributing pressure on top of Iran's own inflation, which was already running at 40-50% a year from currency depreciation and sanctions before the invasion.
Caveat: Iran's inflation is overwhelmingly a domestic monetary and exchange-rate phenomenon; the global commodity shock is a minor, hard-to-isolate addition rather than a primary driver.
Lag: Within 2022.Source: OFAC — Russia-Related Sanctions232023Return to policy orthodoxyRelevanceAttribution
Post-election economic team (Mehmet Şimşek at Treasury, Hafize Gaye Erkan then Fatih Karahan at the central bank) begins reversing years of low-rate policy with sharp rate hikes to combat inflation.
Why this link: Turkey is a comparator series on this inflation chart; the post-election team's sharp rate hikes are the direct policy instrument aimed at reversing the low-rate-driven inflation surge, with disinflation becoming visible into 2024-2025.
Caveat: Disinflation from very high rates is slow and only partial through 2024-2025; other supply and fiscal factors also matter.
Lag: Effects unfold over 2023-2025Source: IMF Turkey country page
Related_Laws
Laws related to this measure. A law need not have caused a movement to be listed. Relevance = should you see it here at all. Attribution = how confidently we can say it moved the line.
1944RelevanceAttributionآئين نامه راجع به كوپنها و دفترچه هاي جيره بندي
Why this link: As a formal price/quantity-control regime on staple goods, this 1944 bylaw is historical context for Iran's long-run inflation and price-control story, even though it predates the modern CPI series carried on the site.
Caveat: No CPI series on the site covers 1944; this link is contextual, not measurable against a specific chart series.
Lag: Not applicable, historical context only.1995RelevanceAttributionرأي شماره 61 هيأت عمومي ديوان عدالت ادار ... يره شركت پست درخصوص تعرفه خدمات مخابراتي
Why this link: This 1995 Administrative Justice Court ruling addresses the Post Company's telecommunications service tariffs, a regulated communications price feeding into the price index and telecom-sector cost structure.
Caveat: A narrow, sector-specific tariff dispute from the pre-mobile-telecom era; its weight in the aggregate price index is minor and cannot be isolated from broader inflation drivers of the mid-1990s.
Lag: Short, within months of the ruling.2004RelevanceAttributionرأي شماره 187 هيأت عمومي ديوان عدالت ادا ... ياتي و شرايط عمومي تعرفه هاي آب و فاضلاب
Why this link: This 2004 Administrative Justice Court ruling addresses the terms and general conditions of water and wastewater tariffs, a regulated household utility price that feeds into the consumer price index.
Caveat: A single adjudication on tariff terms for one utility; its weight within the broader CPI basket is small and cannot be separated from the many other administered-price changes each year.
Lag: Short, within the billing cycle following the ruling.2007RelevanceAttributionExecutive Bylaw of the Unorganized Monetary Market Regulation Act
Implements the Act on Regulating the Unorganized Monetary Market by requiring non-bank credit and financial institutions, currency exchange bureaus and leasing companies to obtain a license from the Central Bank of Iran and comply with its prudential and capital rules, bringing informal money-lending and credit activity under Central Bank supervision.
Why this link: As a national-scale regulation of informal money markets, this law is a major channel into Iran's broader monetary aggregates, interest-rate structure, and consequently the inflation dynamics that a large, price-setting informal credit market can amplify.
Caveat: Monetary aggregates, interest rates, and inflation in Iran are shaped by many larger forces, government deficit financing, sanctions, exchange-rate pass-through, so this law's specific contribution is real but cannot be isolated from those.
Lag: 1-3 years, diffuse.2021RelevanceAttributionرأي شماره 1362 هيأت عمومي ديوان عدالت اد ... ين قيمت شن و ماسه توسط كارگروه مذكور است
Why this link: This 2021 court ruling annulled a working group's authority to set prices for sand and gravel, a specific construction input; the database holds no dedicated construction-materials price series, so its closest, weak connection is to Iran's general price indices.
Caveat: Sand and gravel are a minor share of the CPI/WPI basket, and this ruling only removes one agency's price-setting power rather than changing supply, demand or cost conditions, so any effect on general price indices is negligible and not separately observable.
Lag: None separately observable.2022RelevanceAttributionرأي شماره 763 هيأت عمومي ديوان عدالت ادا ... جلسه مورخ 1398 09 11 كارگروه تنظيم بازار
Why this link: This 2022 court ruling concerns decisions of a market-regulation working group, a body involved in administrative price interventions, giving it a weak, general connection to Iran's price-index series.
Caveat: The ruling addresses one working group's procedural authority, not the price level itself, so no measurable effect on CPI or WPI can be attributed to it.
Lag: None separately observable.